This morning on Twitter, Buzzfeed editor Miriam Elder asks the following question:
Possibly stupid question: is the Signal desktop client as secure as the mobile app?
— Miriam Elder (@MiriamElder) March 3, 2017
No, this is not a stupid question. Actually it’s an extremely important question, and judging by some of the responses to this Tweet there are a lot of other people who are confused about the answer.
Since I couldn’t find a perfect layperson’s reference anywhere else, I’m going to devote this post to providing the world’s simplest explanation of why, in the threat model of your typical journalist, your desktop machine isn’t very safe. And specifically, why you’re safer using a modern mobile device — and particularly, an iOS device — than just about any other platform.
A brief caveat: I’m a cryptographer, not a software security researcher. However, I’ve spent the past several years interacting with folks like Charlie and Dan. I’m pretty confident that they agree with this advice.
What’s wrong with my laptop/desktop machine?
Sadly, most of the problem is you.
If you’re like most journalists — and really, most professionals — you spend less than 100% of your time thinking about security. You need to get work done. When you’re procrastinating from work, you visit funny sites your friends link you to on Facebook. Then you check your email. If you’re a normal and productive user, you probably do a combination of all these things every few minutes, all of which culminates in your downloading some email attachment and (shudder) opening it in Word.
You can’t tell journalists “just don’t open attachments.” They will ignore you. Journos open attachments from strangers for a living.
— Eva (@evacide) September 12, 2016
Now I’m not trying to shame you for this. It’s perfectly normal, and indeed it’s necessary if you want to get things done. But in the parlance of security professionals, it also means you have a huge attack surface.
In English, this means that from the perspective of an attacker there are many different avenues to compromise your machine. Many of these aren’t even that sophisticated. Often it’s just a matter of catching you during an unguarded moment and convincing you to download an executable file or an infected Office document. A compromised machine means that every piece of software on that machine is also vulnerable.
If you don’t believe this works, head over to Google and search for “Remote Access Trojans”. There’s an entire commercial market for these products, each of which allows you to remotely control someone else’s computer. These off-the-shelf products aren’t very sophisticated: indeed, most require you to trick your victim into downloading and running some executable attachment. Sadly, this works on most people just fine. And this is just the retail stuff. Imagine what a modestly sophisticated attacker can do.
I do some of those things on my phone as well. Why is a phone better?
Classical (desktop and laptop) operating systems were designed primarily to support application developers. This means they offer a lot of power to your applications. An application like Microsoft Word can typically read and write all the files available to your account. If Word becomes compromised, this is usually enough to pwn you in practice. And in many cases, these applications have components with root (or Administrator) access, which makes them even more dangerous.
Modern phone operating systems like Android and iOS were built on a different principle. Rather than trusting apps with much power, each app runs in a “sandbox” that (mainly) limits it to accessing its own files. If the sandbox works, even a malicious application shouldn’t be able to reach out to touch other apps’ files or permanently modify your system. This approach — combined with other protections such as in-memory code signing, hardware secret storage and routine use of anti-exploitation measures — makes your system vastly harder to compromise.
Of course, sandboxing isn’t perfect. A compromised or malicious app can always access its own files. More sophisticated exploits can “break out” of the sandbox, typically by exploiting a vulnerability in the operating system. Such vulnerabilities are routinely discovered and occasionally exploited.
The defense to this is twofold: (1) first, run a modern, up-to-date OS that receives security patches quickly. And (2) avoid downloading malicious apps. Which brings me to the main point of this post.
Why use iOS?
The fact of the matter is that when it comes to addressing these remaining issues, Apple phone operating systems (on iPhones and iPads) simply have a better track record.
Since Apple is the only manufacturer of iOS devices, there is no “middleman” when it comes to monitoring for iOS issues and deploying iOS security updates. This means that the buck stops at Apple — rather than with some third-party equipment manufacturer. Indeed, Apple routinely patches its operating systems and pushes the patches to all supported users — sometimes within hours of learning of a vulnerability (something that is relatively rare at this point in any case).
Of course, to be fair: Google has also become fairly decent at supporting its own Android devices. However, to get assurance from this process you need to be running a relatively brand new device and it needs to be manufactured by Google. Otherwise you’re liable to be several days or weeks behind the time when a security issue is discovered and patched — if you ever get it. And Google still does not support all of the features Apple does, including in-memory code signing and strong file encryption.
Apple also seems to do a relatively decent job at curating its App Store, at least as compared to Google. And because those apps support a more modern base of phones, they tend to have access to better security features, whereas Android apps more routinely get caught doing dumb stuff for backwards compatibility reasons.
Finally, every recent Apple device (starting with the iPhone 5S and up) also includes a specialized chip known as a “Secure Enclave Processor“. This hardened processor assists in securing the boot chain — ensuring that nobody can tamper with your operating system. It can also protect sensitive values like your passwords, ensuring that only a password or fingerprint can access them.
So does using iOS mean I’m perfectly safe?
Of course not. Unfortunately, computer security today is about resisting attacks. We still don’t quite know how to prevent them altogether.
Indeed, well-funded attackers like governments are still capable of compromising your iOS device (and your Android, and your PC or Mac). Literally the only question is how much they’ll have to spend doing it.
Here’s one data point. Last year a human rights activist in the UAE was targeted via a powerful zero day exploit, likely by his government. However, he was careful. Instead of clicking the link he was sent, the activist sent it to the engineers at Citizenlab who reverse-engineered the exploit. The resulting 35-page technical report by Lookout Security and Citizenlab is a thing of terrifying beauty: it describes a chain of no less than three previously unpublished software exploits, which together would have led to the complete compromise of the victim’s iPhone.
But such compromises don’t come cheap. It’s easy to see this kind of attack costing a million dollars or more. This is probably orders of magnitude more than it would cost to compromise the typical desktop user. That’s important. Not perfect, but important.
You’re telling me I have gto give up my desktop machine?
Not at all. Or rather, while I’d love to tell you then I understand that may not be realistic.
What I am telling you is to be thoughtful about it. If you’re working on something sensitive, consider moving the majority of that work (and communications) to a secure device until you’re ready to share it. Most of us already carry some sort of phone or tablet in addition to our regular computers anyway, so this isn’t too onerous.
You can still use your normal computer just fine, as long as you’re aware of the relative risks. That’s all I’m trying to accomplish with this post.
I expect that many technical people will find this post objectionable, largely because they assume that with their expertise and care they can make a desktop operating system work perfectly safely. And maybe they can! But that’s not who this post is addressed to.
And of course, this post still only scratches the surface of the problem. There’s still the problem of selecting the right applications for secure messaging (e.g., Signal and WhatsApp) and finding a good secure application for notetaking and document collaboration and so on.
But hopefully this post at least starts the discussion.
Source: A Few Thoughts on Cryptographic … @ March 5, 2017 at 11:38AM